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"JurisprudenceDsorientee:"1 The Louisiana

Supreme Court's Theory of Jurisprudential
Valuation, Doerr v. Mobil Oil and Louisiana
Electorate of Gays and Lesbians v. State
I. INTRODUCTION

"What is the law?" This question is undoubtedly straightforward
and fundamental, but in a mixed jurisdiction2 such as Louisiana, the
answer is anything but simple. Picture a scene that plays out
hundreds of times a day throughout Louisiana as well as the rest of
the United States. A new client walks into an attorney's office with
a particular legal problem. Understandably, the client wants to know
if he has a valid legal claim or defense. Provided the attorney is at
least moderately acquainted with the area ofthe law in question, the
client will expect that the attorney will, at least, have the capability to
find the legal rule that governs his problem.
In a common law state, the attorney could look to the statutory
authority, or more simply find a reported case from a appellate court,
that answers the legal question posed by his client and closely
approximates the given fact pattern. Ifthejudge appointed to the case
agrees that the material facts are sufficiently similar, the prior
holding3 will control the legal conclusions of that judge. In
Louisiana, however, relying on the words ofthe Louisiana Supreme
Court, the attorney may or may not, depending upon the case from
which the attorney quotes, be able to assure his client that the prior
holding of a superior court will control the legal questions of his
claim. The cause ofthis disorder is the confusion of the doctrines of
stare decisis and jurisprudence constante. The doctrine of stare
decisis generally states that once a legal question has been decided in
a prior case the issue may not be reexamined by a subsequent tribunal
absent extraordinary circumstances. On the other hand, with
jurisprudence constante, judicial decisions are not controlling on
issues of law. However, if there exists a consistent line ofcases that
arrive at the same legal conclusions using sound logical reasoning,
then the previous rulings are highly persuasive and not controlling.
The Louisiana Supreme Court has not been clear as to the exact
weight accorded to prior cases. As a result, attorneys, and even
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

1. This phrase translates from French to English to mean, "confused or
bewildered jurisprudence."
2. See Planned Parenthood of Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-69, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2808-09.
3. Edgar Bodenheimer, John B. Oakley, Jean C. Love, An Introduction to the

Anglo-American Legal System, Readings and Cases, at 78 (3rd ed. 2001).

680

LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 64

judges, are confused as to whether the much touted civil law concept
ofjurisprudence constante truly controls.
On March 28, 2002, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in the case of
LouisianaElectorateofGaysandLesbians,Inc.v. State,4 handed down
a decision that could have fundamentally changed the way legal
practitioners viewed judicial decisions in Louisiana. But, in reality, the
court simply stated what legal practitioners, both judges and attorneys,
in the state have accepted for quite some time: "... . the law is what this
court has announced it to be.. . ." In some sense courts necessarily
make law; thejudgments and rulings ofthe courts are binding rules for
the parties to the actions. However, in the sense ofprospective rules, or
norms that will apply to future disputes, this level of precedential
valuation may be unwarranted in Louisiana.6
The opinion in LouisianaElectorate is particularly unusual when
viewed in light ofthe same court's decision less than two years earlier
in Doerr v. Mobil Oil, a case in which the court reiterated its well
established support for the civilian approach to precedent jurisprudence constante.7 Is it that decisions from this court constitute
the "law," or are they merely secondary or persuasive sources of law
not to be relied on as the "law," as is suggested in the comments to
Civil Code Article 1?8 Or, is the court attempting to articulate a dual
standard for precedent in which different areas ofthe law are subject to
different precedential rules? This lack ofclarity creates great confusion
and frustration for practitioners, as well as legal professors, in their
efforts to represent their clients or decide cases in the proper manner
withjustifiable confidence. Thus, the Louisiana Supreme Court should
clarify its theory ofjudicial precedential valuation.
Part II of this comment examines the two cases of Doerr and
LouisianaElectoratethat have illustrated the confusion over the proper
weight that should be given to judicial decisions. Subsequently, Part
II (C) discusses the two theories of jurisprudential valuation,
jurisprudence constante and stare decisis, with emphasis given to
germane differences and similarities between the two. Part III analyzes
the distinctions between jurisprudence constante and stare decisis. The
4. 812 So. 2d 626 (La. 2002).
5. Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 236 So. 2d 216 (La. 1970), overruled
on othergrounds by Jagers v. Royal Indem. Co., 276 So. 2d 309, 312 (La. 1973).
6. La. Const. art. 3 § 1, La. Const. art. II § 2; La. Civ. Code Art. 1 states,
"The sources of law are legislation and custom." (2002).
7. 774 So. 2d 119 (La. 2000), reh'ggranted,782 So. 2d 573 (La. 2001).
8. La. Civ. Code Art. 1, comment b states, "According to civilian doctrine,
legislation and custom are authoritative sources of law. They are contrasted with
persuasive or secondary sources of law, such as jurisprudence, doctrine,
conventional usages, and equity, that may guide the court in reaching a decision in
the absence of legislation and custom. (2002) (emphasis added).
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distinction between public law and private law in mixed jurisdictions is
then examined, illuminating how jurisprudence constante is more
appropriate forprivate law, while stare decisis is more appropriate for the
public law. In the final section of Part a1I, the comment addresses the
practical implications ofdetennining precedential value for the practicing
attorney or judge in Louisiana. Finally, Part IV ofthe paper suggests that
the courts either adopt stare decisis, the "defacto precedential system"
or, alternatively that the courts establish a clear and precise dual
valuation system which applies different weight to judicial precedent in
the private and public law arenas.
I. THE VALUE OF PRECEDENT ISUNCLEAR INLOUISIANA SUPREME
COURT CASELAW

A. Doerr v. Mobil Oil
In deciding the case ofDoerrv. Mobil Oil,9 the Louisiana Supreme
0 The
Court overruled its prior decision in Ducote v. Koch Pipeline."
substantive law ofboth ofthese cases can be briefly summarized as they
have little bearing on the subject ofthis comment. In both Ducote and
Doerr,the Supreme Court was called on to determine the meaning ofthe
"pollution exclusion clause" in comprehensive general liability policies
(CGLs). In Ducote,the court held that the pollution exclusion clause in
the CGL should be interpreted broadly so as to exclude from coverage
under the policy any pollution "regardless of whether the release was
intentional or accidental, a one-time event or part ofan on-going pattern
of pollution."" Significantly, this holding represented a departure from
the rule announced by the court in South CentralBell Telephon Co. v.
Ka-Jon Food Stores of Louisiana, Inc., 2 which had been widelX
followed in the state appellate courts and the federal district courts.
This fact was ofgreat importance to the court in Doerr,particularly in its
discussion ofjurisprudence constante."4
In Doerr,the court re-examined the interpretation of the pollution
exclusion clause announced in Ducote. 5 The court held that the
exclusion should not be interpreted as broadly as indicated in Ducote,
and that the CGLs should provide coverage only when the accidents
9. 774 So. 2d 119 (La. 2000), reh 'ggranted,782 So. 2d 573 (La. 2001).
10. 730 So. 2d 432 (La. 1999).
11. Ducote, 730 So. 2d at 437 (emphasis omitted).
12. See South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Ka-Jon Food Stores of La., Inc., 644 So.
2d 357 (La. 1994), vacatedon other grounds, 644 So. 2d 368 (La. 1994).
13. Kathryn M. Knight, The Total and Absolute Pollution Exclusions are
NeitherTotalNorAbsolute, atLeastforNow: Doerrv. MobilOil Corporation,47
Loy.L. Rev. 1153, 1154 (Fall 2001).
14. Doerr,774 So. 2d at 128-29.
15. Id.
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incidentally involve pollutants and are not events of environmental
pollution.' In order to justify its departure from the rule announced
in Ducote, the Louisiana Supreme Court invoked the well
established civilian principle of jurisprudence constante. 17 On
numerous occasions in the past and in no uncertain terms, the
Louisana Supreme Court has made it clear that the common law
doctrine of "stare decisis" is not recognized in Louisiana. 8 The
court was clear that Ducote represented a departure from the
"settled jurisprudence" of the state courts, and that the rule as
established in a South CentralBell Telephone Co.,' 9 and followed
in the appellate courts of the state, was accorded sufficient weight
by those courts as to become custom. If the rule had attained the
stature of "custom,"it would qualify as a primary source of law
under the Louisiana Civil Code.20 Therefore, in Doerr,the court
employed the doctrine of jurisprudence constante to justify its
reversal of the prior holding in Ducote.
Notably, the composition of the Louisiana Supreme Court at the
time of the Doerrdecision was different from the composition at
the time of Ducote. Justice Marcus joined in the majority in
Ducote, but had retired at the time when the Doerrcase was heard.
Justice Lemmon, who did not sit on the panel in Ducote, was the
deciding vote in Doerrthat arguably caused the transposition of the
majority and minority between the two cases.
B. Louisiana Electorate of Gays and Lesbians v. State
Despite its pronouncement in Doerr, in March 2002, the
Louisiana Supreme Court sent a message to the legal community in
Louisiana that was rather2 difficult to understand in light of its own
"settled jurisprudence.", 1 In the case of Louisiana Electorate of
Gays andLesbians v. State, the supreme court stated:
Despite the clarity of our holding to this effect, the district
court chose to depart from Smith and reached a contrary
result on the law. This action involves, at least, a failure by
16. Id. at 136. For the purposes of this paper, the complexities of insurance
contract interpretation are only coincidentally important.

17. Id.

18. See, e.g., Ardoin v. Hartford Acc't & Inderr. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1334
(La. 1978); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So. 2d 576, 578 (La. 1975);
Carter v. Moore, 248 So. 2d 813, 829 (La. 1971).
19. South Cent. Bell Tel. Co., 644 So. 2d 357.
20. La. Civ. Code art. 1 (2001).
21. La. Electorate of Gays and Lesbians, Inc. v. State, 812 So. 2d 626 (La.
2002).
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the lower court to recognize its obligation to follow the law
ofthis State aspronouncedby this court.22
This statement presents the legal practitioner with a plethora of
puzzles. What is this "obligation" the court spoke of in this
excerpt? According to the civil law tradition, specifically the
theory of jurisprudence constante, judges are not bound by prior
decisions, even those announced by higher courts. Likewise, does
the court really intend to mean that the law of Louisiana can be
"pronounced by this court?" If so, then this calls into question the
meaning of Article III of the Louisiana Constitution and its
statement that the legislative power of the state will be vested
solely in the legislature. 2' However, this case does not represent
the first instance in which the Louisiana Supreme Court has
seemingly invoked the "stare decisis" type language. In the case
of Johnson v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., the supreme court
explicitly stated that, in the absence oflegislation, "the law is what
this court has announced it to be., 24 Interestingly, in Louisiana
Electorate, the supreme court made no mention of Doerror the
supposedly "well-established" principle of jurisprudence
constante.
The issue in LouisianaElectorate was not one which was of
great contention in the courts prior to this decision. Nothing in the
opinion suggests that the court could not have used the traditional
civilian method of jurisprudence constante in justifying its
admonition of the trial court. To the contrary, it seems ill-advised
for the court, if it wishes to adhere to the civil law theory of
sources of law, to suggest that inferior courts are somehow obliged
to decide cases according to the precedent of the supreme court
absent an examination of the legal reasoning within that prior
decision. Based on the discussion of jurisprudence constante in
Doerr,the absence of any discussion or recognition of that concept
in Louisiana Electorate is inexplicable. If the concept of
jurisprudence constante is so "well-established," then surely a
court in Louisiana that wished to bind lower courts to its holding
would suggest that the holding met the standard for this level of
valuation.
22. Id.at 629 (emphasis added).
23. La. Const. art. III, § 1.
24. 236 So. 2d 216. Despite the language quoted above, the Johnson court
explicitly stated that Louisiana does not recognize the doctrine of stare decisis. In
addition, the court did not discuss how it is that the judiciary in Louisiana can
"announce" the law when all legislative power is constitutionally vested in the
legislature alone. It is conceded, however, that the court made it clear that this
statement applied when no written law existed.
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C. The Two Theories ofPrecedent
The two cases of Doerrand LouisianaElectorateare significant
to Louisiana law because both represent opposing views ofthe value
ofprecedent in Louisiana law. In order to discuss possible solutions
to this problem, one must fully understand both jurisprudence
constante and stare decisis as they are known in Louisiana and the
United States.
1. JurisprudenceConstante
The civil law places great importance on separating legislative
and judicial functions, while clinging to the theoretical rule that
judges do not make law in the prospective sense. 5 The nature of the
Louisiana Civil Code reflects this separation. Ideally, civilian
methodology holds that civil codes are designed to be complete,
coherent, and clear, thereby eliminating the necessity for judges to
make law. 6 A civilian code should be a logically harmonious body
oflaw that comprehensively foresees many, ifnot most, ofthe future
situations in need ofa legal solution by establishing general principles
from which specific legal rules can be deduced. The emphasis on
logical harmony is clearly evident in the civilian theory ofsources of
law because judges are free to deviate from judicial precedent only
when it is mandated by logical criticism ofthe prior decision.27
Concerning the traditional civilian approach to the judicial
function, the renowned French jurist Marcel Planiol noted:
Judicial interpretation is free inprinciple. Every tribunal may
adopt the solution which it considers the most just and the
best. It is bound neither by decisions which it may have
in analogous cases nor by those of a
rendered previously
' 28
higher court.
One of the fundamental precepts of the civilian tradition is the
superiority of legislation to all other forms of law. 9 Custom, which
is defined in the civil code as a practice repeated for a long period of
25. John Henry Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition, An Introduction to the
Legal Systems ofWestern Europe and Latin America, 30 (Stanford University Press
1969).
26. Id.
27. Infra notes 38-39.
28. 1 Marcel Planiol, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil § 204, at 152 (La. St.
L. Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959).
29. La. Civ. Code art. 3, cmt. (d) (2002); see Merryman, supra note 25, at 27
for the proposition that this is the case in America where legislation is also superior
to judicial decisions and that "the degree of authority oflegislation [is] not a useful
criteria for distinguishing" civil and common law.
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time that acquires the acceptance of the general public as a
governing rule,3" is the only other source that rises to the level of a
primary source of law in the civilian tradition. Doctrine and
jurisprudence are recognized as only secondary or persuasive
sources in the civil law, such as in the Louisiana Civil Code.3'
Therefore, these two concepts are not to be accorded the status of
"law."
According to the civil law theory of precedent, "when a series
of decisions form a 'constant stream of uniform and homogenous
rulings having the same reasoning,'jurisprudenceconstanteapplies
and operates with 'considerable persuasive authority."3'
Stated
differently, when a rule of law, announced by a court, rather than in
legislation, is consistently followed by courts of Louisiana, the rule
will be given great weight by subsequent courts and may even
achieve a level of deference similar to that accorded to legislation.
Judicial decisions, inherently not the "solemn expression of
legislative will,"33 as they are not made by the legislature, must be
somehow transformed into "custom" in order to attain the status of
a primary source of law.34 This must be done in order to conform
to the legislative and doctrinal rule of all civilian jurisdictions that
legislation and custom are the only binding sources of law. The
Louisiana Civil Code gives a definition ofcustom that suggests how
judicial decisions attain this primary status: "[c]ustom results from
practice repeated for a long time and generally accepted as having
acquired the force of law."35 In other words, the practice,
represented by the holding in a judicial decision, must be
recognized by other courts over a long period of time and must be
accompanied by a feeling that the holding is the "law," and
therefore binding.36 Speaking on the possibility ofjudges following
judicial precedent, a noted legal Louisiana legal scholar, Judge
Alvin Rubin, stated:
He [the judge] is not bound to do so, however, because the
doctrine ofstaredecisisdoes not apply. Instead, each judge,
trial and appellate, may consult the civil code and draw
30. La. Civ. Code art. 3 (2002).
31. La. Civ. Code art. 1, cmt. (b) (2002).
32. Doerr,774 So. 2d at 128 (quoting from James L. Dennis, Interpretation
andApplicationofthe Civil CodeandtheEvaluationofJudicialPrecedent,54 La.
L. Rev 1, 15 (1993) (emphasis theirs).
33. La. Civ. Code art. 2 (2002).
34. Robert A. Pascal & W. Thomas Tete, The Work ofthe LouisianaAppellate
Courts for the 1969-1970 Term: Law in General: The Obligatory Force of
Decisions,31 La. L. Rev. 185 (1971).
35. La. Civ. code art. 3 (2002).
36. Id.at cmt. (b).
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anew from its principles ... The judge is guided much
more by doctrine, as expounded in legal treatises by legal
scholars, than by the decisions of colleagues.., the rule is
one of deference to a series of decisions, jurisprudence
constante.37
Jurisprudence constante provides the judge with the opportunity,
regardless of the decisions of any other court, including courts with
appellate jurisdiction, to decide a case based upon what he believes
to be the most reasoned legal interpretation. The judge is under no
obligation to defer to courts with supervisory jurisdiction. In his
1993 Tucker Lecture at the Louisiana State University Law Center,
Judge James Dennis eloquently and succinctly explained that the
basis for the deference given to prior judicial decisions in the civil
law should be based not on simple recognition of similarity in fact
patterns or legal questions. 38 Rather, judges in the civil law should
only defer to the holding in a prior decision if, after careful
examination, they find that the legal reasoning of the judge in the
prior case is sound and applicable to the case at hand.? Therefore,
jurisprudence constante posits its precedential weight in the
veneration ofprior legal reasoning by ajudicial colleague and not by
blind deference to prior holdings.
2. Stare Decisis
"It is a maxim among . . . lawyers," says Gulliver, "that
whatever hath been done before may legally be done again:
and therefore they take special care to record all the decisions
formerly made against commonjustice and the general reason
of mankind."4
LouisianaElectoratesuggests that the Louisiana Supreme Court
is, at least in some sense, adopting or acquiescing to the common law
doctrine of stare decisis.4 The phrase "stare decisis et non quieta
movere" translates most accurately as "to stand by precedents and not

37. Alvin B. Rubin, Hazardsofa Civilian Venturerin aFederalCourt: Travel
and Travail on the Erie Railroad,48 La. L. Rev. 1369, 1372 (1988) (citations
omitted) (emphasis theirs).
38. James L. Dennis, InterpretationandApplication ofthe Civil Codeand the
Evaluation ofJudicialPrecedent,54 La. L. Rev 1, 15 (1993).
39. Id.
40. Bodenheimer, Oakley, & Love, supranote 3, at 89 (quoting from Jonathan
Swift's Gulliver's Travels).
41. La. Electorate of Gays and Lesbians, Inc. v. State, 812 So. 2d 626 (La.
2002).
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to disturb settled points. 42 In effect, this doctrine mandates that
courts abide by and decide cases in accordance with previous
43
decisions of any supervisory court, but not those of inferior courts.
As ajustification for the use ofstare decisis, Edgar Bodenheimer,
late professor at the University of California, Davis and noted scholar
on Anglo-American law, laid out five positive attributes of stare
decisis that illuminate its nature." First, stare decisis provides
private parties with certainty and calculability in their business
interactions.45 If parties can predict the legal rules which will govern
their business transactions, the risk inherent in any transaction will be
necessarily decreased. Second, adherence to precedent enables
attorneys to effectively and efficiently provide reliable advice to their
clients.46 Attorneys would be required to expend vast amounts of
time rearguing every legal point in the case if not for the controlling
authority that can be found in prior cases. Third, stare decisis also
ensures that judges will not act arbitrarily in their decision-making
because it limits their ability to decide cases in discord with
established precedent.47 Judges will not have the liberty of imposing
their personal biases on the parties in a suit if they are bound by the
holdings of prior cases.
The fourth benefit of this theory is that judicial business can be
conducted much more efficiently since the answers to certain legal
questions are, in theory, settled.4" As with attorneys, judges who were
required to make judgements on every point of law each time they
were at issue at any trial, would have enormous time pressures
considering current court dockets. Finally, Bodenheimer asserts that
all humans possess a similar sense ofjustice in which they believe
that similarly situated individuals should be treated in a like manner.49
If two individuals subject to the same legal rule are treated unequally
by different courts then one, if not both, of the judges in these cases
will necessarily be viewed as acting unfairly by society.
Despite the adherence to precedent mandated by stare decisis,
common lawjudges are adept at distinguishing the case at hand from
42. Id. at 88.
43. Id.
44. Bodenheimer, Oakley, & Love, supranote 3, at 89-90.
45. Id. at 89 (quoting Bodenheimer, Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and
Method of the Law (Rev. ed. 1974)).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 90.
48. Id. Justice Cardozo expressed this idea when he stated, "[t]he labor of
judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could
be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one's own course ofbricks on the
secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him."
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 149 (1921).
49. Bodenheimer, Oakley, &Love, supranote 3, at 90.
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a previous decision whose precedent he does not desire to follow.
The art of distinguishment lies is in the ability of a judge to outline
the borders ofthe holding in a previous case. The more restrictive the
interpretation of the previous holding, the more leeway a judge will
have in deciding a case in a different manner. If the holding of a
previous case is precise and limited, then the judge will have little
trouble in formulating facts or considerations which justify a
distinction between the case at hand and the previous decision. One
renowned scholar on stare decisis has remarked that judges and
lawyers have "carried the technique of distinguishing to a very high
pitch of ingenuity."5 °
The true nature of American stare decisis is less obscure when
viewed in the context ofits dissimilarity with traditional English stare
decisis. Prior to 1966, the English courts recognized a more rigid
theory of stare decisis than the American courts did.5 ' Specifically,
the British House of Lords, in London Street Tramways Co. v.
London City Council," established the rule that only an "Act of
Parliament" could modify a ruling on a question of law which had
already been decided by the House ofLords in a previous case.53 This
rigid adherence to precedent is in stark contrast to the more flexible
version found in the United States. But in 1966, Lord Chancellor
Gardiner of the House of Lords stated:
Their Lordships... recognize that too rigid adherence to precedent
may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the
proper development of the law. They propose, therefore, to modify
their present practice and, while treating former decisions of this
a previous decision when
binding,
House as normally
so. 4 to depart from
do
to
right
it appears
At least to some degree most common law courts now recognize that
blind adherence to precedent is undesirable.55
According to the United States Supreme Court, the American
version ofstare decisis is not "an inexorable command." 6 The court
expounded in detail on the appropriateness of overruling past
decisions when it decided not to overrule Roe v. Wade" in its

50. Max Radin, The Trailofthe Calf,32 Cornell L.Q. 137, 143 (1946).
51. Bodenheirner, Oakley, & Love, supranote 3, at 91.

52. Id.
53. Id.

54. Id.(quoting [1966] Weekly Law Reports 1234, 110 Solicitor's Journal 584
(1966)); see alsoW. Barton Leach,Revisionism in the House ofLords: The Bastion
of RigidStare DecisisFalls,80 Harv. L. Rev. 797 (1967).
55. See Bodenheimer, Oakley, & Love, supranote 3, at 91.
56. Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251, 118 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (1998).
57. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705 (1973).
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As noted by
decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey."8
Bodenheimer, "[i]n the United States... the duty to follow precedent
is held to be qualified by the right to overrule prior decisions."59
American courts have recognized the right to overrule previous
decisions particularly when they find those decisions to be "clearly
erroneous." In his book, The Common Law Tradition, Karl
Llewellyn reexamined the Latin phraseology, "[t]he only things we
are told not to move are such as have truly 'come to rest--of which,
in the law of a changing world, there are not too many. '
One explanation for the distinction between the American and
English theories of stare decisis may be the presence of a written
constitution in the United States. As noted by several United States
Supreme Court justices, the difficulty involved in changing the actual
written law does not lend itselfto rigid stare decisis.6" The nature of
a constitution though, is permanence, without which a constitution
would have no power and would be worthless as a basic law. The
inherent power ofa constitution is greatly diminished ifthe society it
governs feels that it is alterable and flexible.62 The power of an easily
amendable or voidable document is nothing more than illusory. Ifthe
court of ultimate authority over the interpretation of a permanent
document is bound by its precedent, any erroneous or ill-advised
interpretations could be inexorably embedded into the law. So not
only could the litigants in a single case be affected by an erroneous or
ill-advised prior holding, but the negative effect will be compounded
by the continual application of the rule in all future cases.
In spite of the wealth of reasons to adhere to precedent as
mandated by stare decisis, even the United States Supreme Court has
articulated clear reasons why certain decisions should not be
followed. The case ofMoragne v. StatesMarine63 provides a glimpse
of civilian-like reasoning in the overruling of a prior decision by a
58. PlannedParenthood,505 U.S. 833, 854-869, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807-16.
(1992).
59. Bodenheimer, Oakley, & Love, supranote 3, at 92.
60. Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition, Deciding Appeals, at 106,
n. 137 (Littler, Brown and Co. 1960).
61. The most notable proponent of this idea was Justice Brandeis. His dissent
in Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 52 S. Ct. 443 (1931),
articulated the concept that stare decisis was inherently not suited for the field of
constitutional law. For a fuller discussion of this viewpoint, see James C.
Rehnquist, The Power That Shall be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, The
Constitutionand The Supreme Court,66 B.U. L. Rev. 345, 349 (March 1986).
62. Michael G. Colantuono, Comment, The Revision of American State
Constitutions: Legislative Power, Popular Sovereignty, and Constitutional
Change,75 Cal. L. Rev. 1473, 1510 (1987) (discussing the "denigration" of state
constitutions as a result of frequent change or amendment).
63. 398 U.S. 375, 403-05, 90 S. Ct. 1772, 1789-90 (1972).
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common law court. There, the court justified, to some degree, its
decision to overrule previous cases by stating, "a judicious
reconsideration ofprecedent cannot be as threatening to public faith
in thejudiciary as continued adherence to a rule unjustified in reason,
which produces different results for breaches ofduty in situations that
cannot be differentiated in policy."' This appeal to "reason" is quite
similar to the civil law justification for diverging from precedent
based upon a belief in the flawed nature ofthe legal reasoning in prior
decisions.
III. ANALYSIS

A. DrawingDistinctionsBetween JurisprudenceConstanteand
StareDecisis
After examining jurisprudence constante and both the English
and American forms of stare decisis, with particular emphasis on the
latter, the difference between the two common law and the civil law
theories may still be obscure. If both notions of precedent allow for
overruling of past decisions, little distinction seems to remain.
Looking to the words of Planiol will give a clue to the true
distinction. It is not the power ofa court to overrule its own decisions
that separates the two traditions. Rather, it is the power of a court to
ignore the established precedent of supervisory courts. It is this
notion of absolute and qualified deference to appellate court decisions
that truly distinguishes jurisprudence constante and stare decisis. By
this statement, the author takes issue with the simplified distinction
that the court inDoerr,referring to Professor Yiannopoulos's treatise
on the civil law, made between the two theories, referring to the
number ofcases decided in accord as the "chief distinction" between
the two theories of precedent.6
6
As plainly stated by Planiol, as well as others,66 the civilian
concept of jurisprudence constante provides a judge with the
opportunity to depart from the "rules oflaw" pronounced by appellate
courts under certain circumstances. If ajudge finds that the reasoning
of the prior decision is flawed he may deviate from that precedent.
Conversely, even under the American version of stare decisis, inferior
courts are legally bound to decide cases in accord with the established
precedent of a supervisory court. As stated by the U.S. Supreme
Court, "[n]eedless to say, only this Court may overrule one of its

64.
65.

Id. at 405, 90 S. Ct. at 1790.
Doerr,774 So. 2d at 129.

66. Supra note 28.
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precedents."6 7 Additionally, federal appellate courts are in full accord
that their decisions are binding precedent on trial courts within their
respective circuits.68
Therefore, the practical distinction between the two valuation
systems lies in the treatment of appellate decisions. The virtue ofthe
civilian tradition lies in its granting discretion to the judge to
determine for himself whether precedent should be followed or
abandoned based on the legitimacy of the logical reasoning in the
precedent. Conversely, the value of the common law tradition lies
in its consistency of legal expression within certain jurisdictions.
As noted by Oliver Wendell Holmes, "[the] prophecies of what
courts will do in fact, and nothing pretentious, are what I mean by
law. 69
It is difficult to say which is the more virtuous of the two
theories, but in the interest of practicality, this author suggests that
stare decisis may be superior. Although dedication and deference
to logic are worthy goals for the judiciary, they may not be
appropriate guidelines for all judges. By utilizing a theory of stare
decisis, the appellate courts and courts of last resort will retain their
power to overrule illogical or undesirable decisions oflower courts
or of themselves. Trial courts will no longer have this power; but
by employing the appropriate channels of appeal, a party that feels
he is being subjected to an irrational holding will have the
opportunity to argue that point to the very court that established the
holding. In addition, by mandating that lower courts abide by the
holdings of higher courts, all of Bodenheimer's positive attributes
will be infused into Louisiana's precedential theory.70 To the public
at large, perhaps the most important of Bodenheimer's attributes is
the duty of fairness exemplified by the equal treatment of similarly
situated individuals.
B. Mixed Jurisdictionsand the PrivateLaw/PublicLaw
Distinction
With its unique mix of civil and common law traditions,
Louisiana vehemently resists exclusive categorization into either the
civilian or common law system. The concept of a "mixed

67. Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand Ltd, 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103
S. Ct. 1343, 1344 (1983).
68. U.S. v. Glaser, 14 F.3d 1213, 1216 (7 Cir. 1994); Zuniga v. United Can
Co., 812 F.2d 443,450 (9 Cir. 1987).
69. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 167,

173 (1920).

70. See supranotes 44-49 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction"'" is somewhat difficult to pin down. As noted by one
comparative scholar, a "mixed jurisdiction" can be defined as "a
legal system which, to an extensive degree, exhibits characteristics
of both the civilian and English common law traditions."72 This
connection with the English common law may be unwarranted in
Louisiana. Another description of "mixed jurisdictions" more
applicable to Louisiana is that of F.P. Walton: "legal systems in
which the Romano-Germanic tradition has become suffused to some
degree by Anglo-American law."73
In mixed jurisdictions like Louisiana, the law is susceptible of
a general division into two separate and distinct areas-those that are
derived from the civil law and those that are derived from the
common law. One ofthe clearest lines marking the separation ofthe
two traditions in substantive law is the division between private law
and public law. Marcel Planiol stated:
Public law regulates the acts ofperson who act in the general
interest, in virtue of a direct or mediate delegation emanating
from the sovereign. Private law regulates the acts which
individuals do in their own names for their individual
interests.74
The legal subjects that private law encompasses are contracts,
property, family law, and successions. In a highly controversial 1937
article on the state of the Louisiana legal system, Gordon Ireland
provided a useful distinction between those areas practiced according
to the common law technique and those areas practiced according to
the civil law technique.75 Those areas listed under "the civil law
technique" include many of the areas listed above: mandate, family
law, prescription, security devices, obligations, and property.76 This
private law of Louisiana is derived mainly from the French and
Spanish civilian traditions,77 with the law ofproperty containing ofan
71. For a comprehensive assessment of "mixed jurisdictions" thrbughout the
world, see William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law
(Codifiedand Uncodified), 60 La. L. Rev. 677 (2000).
72. Robin Evan-Jones, Receptions ofLaw, Mixed Legal Systems andthe Myth
of the Genius ofScots PrivateLaw, 114 L.Q.R. 228, 228 (1998).
73. Maurice Tancelin, Introduction, in F.P. Walton, The Scope and
Interpretation of the Civil Code 1 (Wilson & Lafleur, 1907, reprinted by
Butterworths, 1980).
74. 1 Marcel Planiol, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil, (La. St. L. Inst. trans.,
1953).
75. Gordon Ireland, Louisiana'sLegal System Reappraised,11 Tul. L. Rev.
585, 595-96 (1937).
76. Id.
77. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Two Critical Years in the Life of the LouisianaCivil
Code: 1870 and 1913, 53 La. L Rev. 5, 14 (1992); see also Dart, The Influence of
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abundance of Greek, French, and German influences.78 In some
cases, the articles of the Louisiana Civil Code are near verbatim
copies of the source articles of other continental codes.79
The subjects referred to as public law usually include criminal law,
civil and criminal procedure, and evidence. Domat, another noted
French jurist, asserted that public laws include "... laws which affect
the government, the authority of its powers, the obedience due them,
the forces necessary to maintain public tranquility, the control of
finances, the judicial machinery, the punishment of crimes, the
functions of the various semi-official bodies... , [and] the general
police., 80 Thus, public laws are those laws that, when enforced, insure
public order, or civilized conduct, within the context ofa governmental
state.
As a result of this distinction, it would be inappropriate to apply
the doctrine ofjurisprudence constante to public law as these areas are
not governed by the Civil Code, and in some cases are specifically
governed by federal law.8 The federal court system is governed by the
common law and its concept of precedent, stare decisis, is naturally
more appropriate than is jurisprudence constante - a purely civil law
concept. It is essential to the functioning ofa civilized society that laws
which govern public order be uniform, at least in the sense that
similarly situated individuals are treated in a similar manner with
respect to their interaction with the sovereign. Two Louisiana district
courts, following the rule ofjurisprudence constante, could grant two
citizens of the state, both subject to the same constitution, different
protection from governmental intrusion because each judge would be
free to interpret the Louisiana Constitution however he saw fit.
Alternatively, in matters ofprivate law, jurisprudence constante is
a more appropriate method for evaluating prior cases. Although the
Civil Code may be limited in its application, by the fact that it is only
a subpart ofthe whole ofLouisiana law and not all-encompassing like
the state constitution, it certainly applies to those areas of the law
contained within its own pages. Therefore Articles 1-4 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, which are general statements of traditional
the Ancient Laws of Spain on the Jurisprudenceof Louisiana,6 Tul. L. Rev. 83
(1931). Ireland's article also discusses the nature of the use of the Spanish law,
specifically La Siete Partides,by Louisiana subsequent to Governor O'Reilly's
assumption of authority in 1769, see Bodenheimer, supra note 40.
78. See generally Greek Civil Code; A.N. Yiannopolous, 2 La. Civ. L.
Treatise, Property § 8 (4th ed.).
79. See supra note 63; Tucker, Source Books of LouisianaLaw III, Spanish
Laws, 8 Tul. L. Rev. 396 (1934).
80. Domat, Le DroitPublic(quoting Planiol, Traite Elementaire de Droit Civil
§ 19, n.15 (La. St. L. Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1958).
81. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2, otherwise knows as the Supremacy Clause,
provides that when state and federal laws conflict, the federal law prevails.
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civilian source hierarchy, should necessarily control. In addition, the
nature of private law, the regulation of interactions between
individuals, lends itself to a more fluid and individualistic
interpretation of law.
To consider the appropriateness of flexible precedential valuation,
one could consider the regulation and interpretation of private
contracts. Factors surrounding the formation of a contract, such as
consent and capacity, may necessitate conflicting holdings based upon
equity. On the issue of consent, two identically situated individuals
may react in different ways to the same external influence thereby
affecting their consent to the contract in varying degrees. Some
judgments as to capacity are based not on objective determinations such
as age, but on the subjective determination of the judge as to whether
the contracting party had the mental capacity to contract. This aspect
of a person's capacity may be affected by drunkenness or imbecility
which are by their nature case specific standards into which the judge
must inquire.
Undoubtedly people adjust their conduct in reliance on the law.
But it is more fundamental to ensure consistent public order, such as in
cases of criminal punishment, than to decide the interpretation of a
contract in exactly the same manner each time the contract comes
before a court. The criminal system not only subjects one to financial
and proprietary sanctions, but also to forfeiture ofpersonal liberty in the
form of imprisonment, and in the case of capital punishment, the
forfeiture of life itself. Contractual interpretation by a court might
result in the loss of one's property or wealth, but is not likely to affect
the very basic societal existence ofthe contractors, (i.e. whether or not
they are imprisoned) nor will it result in the death ofeither party at the
hands ofthe sovereign. The nature of contracts themselves suggest that
it is more important to evaluate the will ofthe parties involved than the
exact wording of the document attesting to the contractual
relationship.82 If the will of the parties is the most important
consideration, then absolute predictability as to the interpretation of
contractual clauses is not necessary to effectuate a just solution to a
private dispute.
This example of contract interpretation illustrates why it is
appropriate to apply jurisprudence constante, a theory that provides
relatively more flexibility to judges, to the private law. Generally
speaking, the feeling of unfair or unequal treatment will be more
pronounced in cases involving citizens' interaction with the sovereign.
82. La. Civ. Code art. 2045 (2002): "Interpretation of a contract is the
determination of the common intent ofthe parties." It is conceded that Civil Code
Article 2046 states that "no further interpretation" is necessary if the contract is
unambiguous, but Civil Code Articles 2046- 2057 all address situations in which
contracts are unclear.
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Therefore, stare decisis, a theory that mandates relatively strict
adherence to precedent, is a more appropriate method of evaluating
precedent in public law matters.
C. The Reality ofPracticingLaw and Deciding Cases in
Louisiana
Despite the situation described in the introduction, most attorneys
practicing in Louisiana today feel confident knowing they have
advised their clients with a fair degree ofcertainty with regard to the
law governing their particular problem. This assurance results from
the reality ofthe legal practice in Louisiana. It is not unlike that of its
common law brethren states. Attorneys rely, almost exclusively, on
the interpretations of the law, including the civil code articles, found
in reported opinions.
Mindful of the traditional civilian
understanding ofprecedent, Planiol even went so far as to state in his
civil law treatise, "[ilt is quite true that the courts are not bound to
follow decisions previously made by them: but in fact they usually do
so. ''83 With respect to Louisiana in particular, "[i]t is simply no
longer the case in Louisiana's private-law system that a court may
rely on the appropriate code articles without conducting an exhaustive
study of the accompanying case law. ' 4
One would be hard pressed to find an attorney, much less a legal
malpractice insurer, in Louisiana that would argue a case based solely
on the text of the written law. The logic supporting this type of
behavior is simple. Judges express their opinions about the correct
interpretation ofa given law or legal question. Absent some change
in the membership of a given court,85 an attorney would be more than
justified in presuming that the court will rule similarly in subsequent
cases. In addition, although the civil law recognizes the right of
lower courts to deviate from the precedent of superior courts in
certain circumstances, this rarely occurs. Once again, this behavior
is completely understandable. As no judge desires to be overruled,
he will normally conform his decisions to the interpretations of law
propounded by his superiors in the appellate courts. For these, as
well as other reasons, the courts of Louisiana are predisposed to
decide cases based on the holdings of previous cases.8 6
83. 1 Marcel Planiol, TraiteElementairede DroitCivil, § 204, at 152 (La. St.
L. Inst. trans., 12th ed. 1959).
84. Kent A. Lambert, The Suffocation ofa Legal Heritage: A Comparative
Analysis of Civil Procedure in Louisiana and France-The Corruption of
Louisiana'sCivilian Tradition,67 Tul L. Rev. 231, 265 (1992).
85. See discussion of Doerrin Section II(A).
86. As noted by Justice Victory in a recent dissent to an overruling of a
previous holding of the La. Supreme Court, "[J]udicial flip-flops do nothing for the
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In addition to the practical considerations ofjudges, educational
methods have some influence on the writing and reasoning of
Louisiana judges. As Professor Ireland pointed out, the law classes
in Louisiana are taught by the case law or common law method."
This observation holds true for Louisiana law schools even today."8
Therefore, the common law method of reasoning from precedent
tends to dominate the thinking of practicing attorneys as well as
judges in Louisiana. Unlike their European civilian counterparts,
who never work as attorneys, Louisiana judges are chosen from
among the general population of attorneys. This fact tends to
encourage Louisiana judges to consider issues of practicality based
upon their prior legal experience as practicing attorneys. Judges will
therefore be more receptive to arguments based upon the practical
considerations ofattorneys who must, in the interest ofefficiency and
certainty, rely on previous decisions of the courts. Additionally, as
one of fifty states, forty-nine of which are common-law states,
Louisiana attorneys are often exposed in their dealings with lawyers
and legal issues outside Louisiana to heavy doses ofthe common-law
methodology, including profuse reliance on case law. Louisiana
attorneys have also come to utilize the same tools oflegal research as
the rest of the United States, which provide comprehensive
compilations of case law by all of the state's courts.
IV. CONCLUSION

The cases of Doerr and Louisiana Electorate illustrate the
difficulty in maintaining the civil law concept of jurisprudence
constante in a mixed jurisdiction like Louisiana. Some cases decided
by Louisiana courts will, by way of the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, have to be decided in accordance with the
doctrine of stare decisis. That is the law of the federal courts.89
However, modem American stare decisis is of such a nature as to
provide for similar if not the same outcomes. Doerrwas decided
based upon a traditional understanding of the theory ofjurisprudence
constante as some sort of prerequisite for overturning Ducote. If, as
the Louisiana Supreme Court held, Ducote truly were a departure
from the settled jurisprudence of this state, the court could
integrity of our judicial system.... ." Williams v. Jackson Parish Hosp., 798 So.
2d 921 (La. 2001) (Victory, J., dissenting).
87. Gordon Ireland, Louisiana'sLegal System Reappraised,11 Tul. L. Rev.
585, 595 (1937).
88. Few, if any, classes taught at Louisiana law schools today are taught
without the heavy use ofjudicial opinions as explanations and clarifications ofthe
law as pronounced in the Civil Code or in statutes.
89. Supra note 87.
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doubtlessly have arrived at a similar conclusion using the commonly
understood American form of stare decisis.
After examining bothjurisprudence constante and stare decisis, as
it is practiced in the United States, the practical similarity in the
application of the two theories becomes apparent. 90 Both theories
provide for at least some level ofdeference to prior judicial decisions,
especially those of courts with supervisory jurisdiction. In addition,
both provide a mechanism by which a subsequent court may decide a
case at hand in a manner inconsistent with that ofa previous court. The
civil law court will more readily overrule and thereafter justify its
action based upon a reassessment ofthe legal reasoning ofthe previous
court. The common law court, on the other hand, will likely use the
tool ofdistinguishment so as to theoretically comply with the precedent
while avoiding the perceived injustice.
At the heart ofthe problem presented bythe conflicting opinions of
Doerr and Louisiana Electorate is a confusion of doctrines by the
Supreme Court of Louisiana, exemplified by careless language in its
opinions. 9' It is unlikely that the outcome in either case would be
substantially different had the court chosen to rely solely on
jurisprudence constante or stare decisis. What is significant, however,
is that the court has not made it clear which doctrine it intends to
support in future cases. First, if the court wishes to bind the lower
courts only in cases similar to LouisianaElectorate,at its core a public
law issue, it needs to make that clear. This determination seems
unwarranted considering that the court in that case wanted to bind the
trial court not to its interpretation of a criminal law, but to a
constitutional issue, which by nature is not as receptive to strict
precedential adherence. 92
Second, if the Supreme Court is earnest in its desire to retain
Louisiana's civilian traditions, including the theory of jurisprudence
constante, then it should be more careful when it informs trial courts of
their obligation93 to follow the decisions it renders. The Court should
qualify that statement with the caveat that a Louisianajudge should not
feel obliged to follow the decisions ofany Louisiana court if the judge
truly believes that the legal reasoning in the prior decision is flawed.
However, the best choice would be for the Louisiana courts to
decline to adopt either of these alternatives, but rather adhere to a
system of precedential valuation more akin to stare decisis. The
90. Albert Tate, Jr., CivilianMethodology in Louisiana,44 Tul. L. Rev. 673
(1970). Judge Tate recognized that observers of both Louisiana courts and
American common-law courts will likely see little difference in the way cases are
argued and decided.
91. See supra notes 20 and 40.
92. See supranote 51 and accompanying text.
93. Supra note 24.
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similarities between the American form of stare decisis and the
practical application of jurisprudence constante in Louisiana courts
indicate no need for theoretical distinction.94 The Louisiana Supreme
Court should refrain from suggestions, despite their basis in civilian
tradition, that each district court in Louisiana has the right to announce
a different rule of law for its own district despite the holdings of the
appellate courts or even the state supreme court. This is not conducive
to consistent application ofthe law throughout Louisiana, and it should
be avoided. Despite Gulliver's warning,95 courts following the rule of
stare decisis do not necessarily perpetuate bad law, they merely rely on
the appellate courts to correct their past mistakes without clear
usurpation of authority.
In the alternative, the Louisiana Supreme Court might, based upon
its apparent willingness to accept either the civil law or common law
theory ofprecedent, establish a dual system ofprecedent in Louisiana.
This system would provide that in cases in which the legal issues are
confined to the subjects of the civil code, or even in cases of
constitutional interpretation, the traditional civilian theory of
jurisprudence constante would apply. However, in the cases in which
public laws are at issue, such as criminal law or procedure, the court
could be more strict in its requirement that lower courts accept its
rulings as "law." The relative and personal nature ofprivate law lends
itself toward the civilian concept ofjurisprudence constante with its
slightly less rigid attitude toward precedent. Public laws, on the other
hand, in order to provide for the orderly governance of society in
relation to the sovereign, are logically more susceptible ofvaluation in
accordance with the American understanding of stare decisis. Finally,
Louisiana should give deference to the traditions from which the state
derives its law and their necessarily more extensive understanding of
the proper interpretation of the legal subjects derived therefrom. In
other words, Louisiana courts should apply civilian precedent theory to
those areas primarily based on the civil law and common law precedent
theory to those areas based on the American common law.
JasonEdwin Dunahoe*
94. See, e.g., State v. Jackson, 764 So. 2d 64 (La. 2000). This case is a notable
example of how the Louisiana Supreme Court is acting like other American courts.
In this case, the court "expressly overruled" the prior decision of the court in State
v. Church, 538 So. 2d 993 (1989). Nowhere in the overruling decision does the
court justify its action of overturning the decision. The court, just as most
American appellate courts do, assumes that it has the right to overrule its own prior
decisions.
95. See infranote 40.
* J.D./B.C.L. Candidate, May, 2004, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana
State University.

